We determine the exact sum secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) of the K -user Gaussian interference channel. We consider three different secrecy constraints: 1) K -user interference channel with one external eavesdropper (IC-EE); 2) K -user interference channel with confidential messages (IC-CM); and 3) K -user interference channel with confidential messages and one external eavesdropper (IC-CM-EE). We show that for all of these three cases, the exact sum secure d.o.f. is K (K − 1)/(2 K − 1). We show converses for IC-EE and IC-CM, which imply a converse for IC-CM-EE. We show achievability for IC-CM-EE, which implies achievability for IC-EE and IC-CM. Our converse is based on developing a direct relationship between the differential entropies of the channel inputs and the rates of the users, and quantifying the effect of eavesdropping on the rates in terms of the differential entropies of the eavesdroppers' observations. Our achievability is based on structured signaling, structured cooperative jamming, channel prefixing, and asymptotic real interference alignment. While the traditional interference alignment provides some amount of secrecy by mixing unintended signals in a smaller subspace at every receiver, in order to attain the optimum sum secure d.o.f., we incorporate structured cooperative jamming into the achievable scheme, and intricately design the structure of all of the transmitted signals jointly.
. K -user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints.
Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [4] . This line of research has been subsequently extended to many multi-user settings, e.g., broadcast channels with confidential messages [5] , [6] , multi-receiver wiretap channels [7] [8] [9] [10] (see also a survey on extensions of these to MIMO channels [11] ), interference channels with confidential messages [5] , [12] , interference channels with external eavesdroppers [13] , multiple access wiretap channels [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , wiretap channels with helpers [19] , relay eavesdropper channels [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] , compound wiretap channels [26] , [27] , etc. While the channel models involving a single transmitter, such as broadcast channels with confidential messages and multi-receiver wiretap channels, are relatively better understood, the channel models involving multiple independent transmitters, such as interference channels with confidential messages and/or external eavesdroppers, multiple access wiretap channels, wiretap channels with helpers, and relay-eavesdropper channels, are much less understood. The exact secrecy capacity regions of all these multiple-transmitter models remain unknown, even in the case of simple Gaussian channels. In the absence of exact secrecy capacity regions, achievable secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regimes has been studied in the literature [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] . In this paper, we focus on the K -user interference channel with secrecy constraints, and determine its exact sum secure d.o.f.
The K -user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints consists of K transmitter-receiver pairs each wishing to have secure communication over a Gaussian interference channel (IC); see Fig. 1 . We consider three different secrecy constraints: 1) K -user interference channel with one external eavesdropper (IC-EE), where K transmitter-receiver pairs wish to have secure communication against an external 0018-9448 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. eavesdropper, see Fig. 2(a) . 2) K -user interference channel with confidential messages (IC-CM), where there are no external eavesdroppers, but each transmitter-receiver pair wishes to secure its communication against the remaining K − 1 receivers, see Fig. 2(b) . 3) K -user interference channel with confidential messages and one external eavesdropper (IC-CM-EE), which is a combination of the previous two cases, where each transmitter-receiver pair wishes to secure its communication against the remaining K − 1 receivers and the external eavesdropper, see Fig. 2 (c).
In the Gaussian wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity is the difference between the channel capacities of the transmitterreceiver and the transmitter-eavesdropper pairs [4] . It is well-known that this difference does not scale with the SNR, and hence the secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap channel is zero, indicating a severe penalty due to secrecy in this case. Fortunately, this does not hold in most multi-user scenarios, including the interference channel. Reference [28] showed that nested lattice codes and layered coding are useful in providing positive sum secure d.o.f. for the K -user IC-CM; their result gave a sum secure d.o.f. of less than 3 4 for K = 3. Reference [29] used interference alignment to achieve a sum secure d.o.f. of K (K −2)
2K −2 for the K -user IC-CM, which gave 3 4 for K = 3. Based on the same idea, [29] , [30] achieved a sum secure d.o.f. of K (K −1)
2K
for the K -user IC-EE, which gave 1 for K = 3. The approach used in [29] and [30] is basically to evaluate the secrecy performance of the interference alignment technique [42] devised originally for the K -user interference channel without any secrecy constraints. Since the original interference alignment scheme puts all of the interfering signals into the same reduced-dimensionality sub-space at a receiver, it naturally provides a certain amount of secrecy to those signals as an unintended byproduct, because the interference signals in this sub-space create uncertainty for one another and make it difficult for the receiver to decode them. However, since the end-goal of [42] is only to achieve reliable decoding of the transmitted messages at their intended receivers, the d.o.f. it provides is sub-optimal when both secrecy and reliability of messages are considered.
Recently, the exact sum secure d.o.f. of the two-user IC-CM was obtained to be 2 3 in [38] . This reference showed that while interference alignment is a key ingredient in achieving positive secure d.o.f., a more intricate design of the signals is needed to achieve the simultaneous end-goals of reliability at the desired receivers and secrecy at the eavesdroppers. In particular, in [38] , each transmitter sends both message carrying signals, as well as cooperative jamming signals. This random mapping of the message carrying signals to the channel inputs via cooperative jamming signals may be interpreted as channel prefixing [3] . Both the message carrying signals and the cooperative jamming signals come from the same discrete alphabet, and hence are structured. In addition, the signals are carefully aligned at the legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers using real interference alignment [43] .
In particular, at each receiver, the unintended message and both jamming signals are constrained in the same interference sub-space, providing an interference-free sub-space for the intended message. Further, inside the interference sub-space, each unintended message is protected by aligning it with the jamming signal from the other transmitter. Such a perfect alignment provides a constant upper bound for the information leakage rate. In this paper, we generalize the results in [38] to the case of K -user interference channel, for K > 2. Our generalization has three main components: 1) While [38] considered IC-CM only, we consider both IC-CM and IC-EE and their combination IC-CM-EE in a unified framework. To this end, we show converses separately for IC-EE and IC-CM, which imply a converse for IC-CM-EE; and we show achievability for IC-CM-EE, which implies achievability for IC-EE and IC-CM. The achievability and converse meet giving an exact sum secure d.o.f. of K (K −1)
2K −1 for all three models.
2) For achievability: In the case of two-user IC-CM in [38] , each message needs to be delivered reliably to one receiver and needs to be protected from another receiver. This requires alignment at two receivers, which is achieved in [38] by simply choosing transmission coefficients properly, which cannot be extended to the K -user case here. In the K -user IC-CM-EE case, we need to deliver each message to a receiver, while protecting it from K other receivers. This requires designing signals in order to achieve alignment at K + 1 receivers simultaneously: at one receiver (desired receiver) we need alignment to ensure that the largest space is made available to message carrying signals for their reliable decodability, and at K other receivers, we need to align cooperative jamming signals with message carrying signals to protect them. These requirements create two challenges: i) aligning multiple signals simultaneously at multiple receivers, and ii) upper bounding the information leakage rates by suitable functions which can be made small. We overcome these challenges by using an asymptotical approach [44] , where we introduce many signals that carry each message and align them simultaneously at multiple receivers only order-wise (i.e., align most of them, but not all of them), and by developing a method to upper bound the information leakage rate by a function which can be made small. In contrast to the constant upper bound for the information leakage rate in [38] , here the upper bound is not constant, but a function which can be made small. This is due to the non-perfect (i.e., only asymptotical) alignment. 3) For the converse: To the best of our knowledge, the only known upper bound for the sum secure d.o.f. of the K -user interference channel with secrecy constraints is K 2 , which is the upper bound with no secrecy constraints [42] . The upper bounding technique for the two-user IC-CM in [38] considers one single confidential message against the corresponding unintended receiver each time, since in that case the eavesdropping relationship is straightforward: for each message there is only one eavesdropper and for each eavesdropper there is only one confidential message. However, in the case of K -user IC, each message is required to be kept secret against multiple eavesdroppers and each eavesdropper is associated with multiple unintended messages. To develop a tight converse, we focus on the eavesdropper as opposed to the message. In the converse for IC-EE, we consider the sum rate of all of the messages eavesdropped by the external eavesdropper. We sequentially apply the role of a helper lemma in [38] to each transmitter by treating its signal as a helper to another specific transmitter. In the converse for IC-CM, for each receiver (which also is an eavesdropper), we consider the sum rate of all unintended messages, and again apply the role of a helper lemma in a specific structure.
II. SYSTEM MODEL, DEFINITIONS AND THE RESULT
The input-output relationships for a K -user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints (Fig. 1 ) are given by
where Y i is the channel output of receiver i , Z is the channel output of the external eavesdropper (if there is any), X i is the channel input of transmitter i , h j i is the channel gain of the j th transmitter to the i th receiver, g j is the channel gain of the j th transmitter to the eavesdropper (if there is any), and {N 1 , . . . , N K , N Z } are mutually independent zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian random variables. All the channel gains are independently drawn from continuous distributions. 1 Once they are generated, the channel gains are fixed (time-invariant) throughput the communication session and are known to all entities. We further assume that all h j i are non-zero, and all g j are non-zero if there is an external eavesdropper. All channel inputs satisfy average power constraints, E X 2 i ≤ P, for i = 1, . . . , K .
Each transmitter i intends to send a message W i , uniformly chosen from a set W i , to receiver i . The rate of the message is R i = 1 n log |W i |, where n is the number of channel uses. Transmitter i uses a stochastic function f i : W i → X i to encode the message, where X i = X n i is the n-length channel input of user i . We use boldface letters to denote n-length vector signals, e.g., X i = X n i , Y j = Y n j , Z = Z n , etc. The legitimate receiver j decodes the message asŴ j based on its observation Y j . A rate tuple (R 1 , . . . , R K ) is said to be achievable if for any > 0, there exist joint n-length codes such that each receiver j can decode the corresponding message reliably, i.e., the probability of decoding error is less than for all messages,
and the corresponding secrecy requirement is satisfied. We consider three different secrecy requirements: 1) In IC-EE, Fig. 2 (a), all of the messages are kept information-theoretically secure against the external eavesdropper,
2) In IC-CM, Fig. 2 (b), all unintended messages are kept information-theoretically secure against each receiver, Fig. 2 (c), all of the messages are kept information-theoretically secure against both the K − 1 unintended receivers and the eavesdropper, i.e., we impose both secrecy constraints in (4) and (5) . The supremum of all sum achievable secrecy rates is the sum secrecy capacity C s, , and the sum secure d.o.f., D s, , is defined as
The main result of this paper is stated in the following theorem. We now remark on the for almost all channel gains statement in Theorem 1. Our converse proof is valid for all fixed channel gains. On the other hand, our achievability is valid for almost all channel gains. Similar to the discussion in [38, Sec. X.B], there exists a set of channel gains A in the space of all channel gains, where our achievability proof is not valid. Such an example set of channel gains is obtained when all of the channel gains are the same, e.g.,
In this case, we have zero sum secure d.o.f. since all the receivers have statistically identical observations. More generally, the achievability proof does not work for rational channel gains. This is typical of achievability schemes that use real interference alignment, see for instance [36] , [44] [45] [46] . Fortunately, such a set A has zero Lebesgue measure, and this is what we mean by for almost all channel gains. 2
III. PRELIMINARIES

A. Role of a Helper Lemma
For completeness, we repeat [38, Lemma 2] here, which is called role of a helper lemma. This lemma identifies a constraint on the signal of a given transmitter, based on the decodability of another transmitter's message at its intended receiver.
Lemma 1 ( [38] ): For reliable decoding of the kth transmitter's signal at the kth receiver, the channel input of transmitter i = k, X i , must satisfy
where c is a constant which does not depend on P, andÑ is a new Gaussian random variable independent of all other random variables with σ 2
Lemma 1 gives an upper bound on the differential entropy of (a noisy version of) the signal of any given transmitter, transmitter i in (8) , in terms of the differential entropy of the channel output and the message rate n R k = H (W k ), of a user k, based on the decodability of message W k at its intended receiver. The inequality in this lemma, (8) , can alternatively be interpreted as an upper bound on the message rate, i.e., on n R k , in terms of the difference of the differential entropies of the channel output of a receiver k and the channel input of a transmitter i ; in particular, the higher the differential entropy of the signal coming from user i , the lower this upper bound will be on the rate of user k. This motivates not using i.i.d. Gaussian signals which have the highest differential entropy. Also note that this lemma does not involve any secrecy constraints, and is based only on the decodability of the messages at their intended receivers.
B. Real Interference Alignment
In this subsection, we review pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) and real interference alignment [43] , [44] , similar to the review in [36, Sec. III] and [38, Sec. III.C]. The purpose of this subsection is to illustrate that by using real interference alignment, the transmission rate of a PAM scheme can be made to approach the Shannon achievable rate at high SNR. This provides a universal and convenient way to design capacity-achieving signalling schemes at high SNR by using PAM for different channel models as will be done in Section VI.
1) Pulse Amplitude Modulation: For a point-to-point scalar Gaussian channel,
with additive Gaussian noise N of zero-mean and variance σ 2 , and an input power constraint E X 2 ≤ P, assume that the input symbols are drawn from a PAM constellation,
where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number to normalize the transmit power. Note that, a is also the minimum distance d min (C) of this constellation, which has the probability of error
whereX is an estimate for X obtained by choosing the closest point in the constellation C(a, Q) based on observation Y.
The transmission rate of this PAM scheme is
since there are 2Q + 1 signalling points in the constellation. For any small enough δ > 0, if we choose Q = P 1−δ 2 and a = γ P δ 2 , where γ is a constant independent of P, then
and we can have Pr(e) → 0 and R → 1 2 log P as P → ∞. That is, we can have reliable communication at rates approaching 1 2 log P. Note that the PAM scheme has small probability of error (i.e., reliability) only when P goes to infinity. For arbitrary P, the probability of error Pr(e) is a finite number. Similar to the steps in [44] and [46] , we connect the PAM transmission rate to the Shannon rate in the following derivation. We note that Shannon rate of I (X; Y ) is achieveable with arbitrary reliability using a random codebook:
where we use the Markov chain X → Y →X and bound H (X|X) using Fano's inequality. Therefore, we can achieve the rate in (19) with arbitrary reliability, where for any fixed P, Pr(e) in (19) is the probability of error of the PAM scheme given in (13) , which is a well-defined function of P. For a finite P, while Pr(e) may not be arbitrarily small, the rate achieved in (19) , which is smaller than the rate of PAM in (12), is achieved arbitrarily reliably. We finally note that as P goes to infinity Pr(e) goes to zero exponentially, and from (19), both PAM transmission rate and the Shannon achievable rate have the same asymptotical performance, i.e., PAM transmission rate has 1 Shannon d.o.f.
2) Real Interference Alignment:
This PAM scheme for the point-to-point scalar channel can be generalized to multiple data streams. Let the transmit signal be
where c 1 , . . . , c L are rationally independent real numbers, 3 and each b i is drawn independently from the constellation C(a, Q) in (10) . The real value x is a combination of L data streams, and the constellation observed at the receiver consists of (2Q + 1) L signal points. By using the Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation in number theory, [43] , [44] bounded the minimum distance d min of points in the receiver's constellation: For any δ > 0, there exists a constant k δ , such that
for almost all rationally independent {c i } L i=1 , except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero. Since the minimum distance of the receiver constellation is lower bounded, with proper choice of a and Q, the probability of error can be made arbitrarily small, with rate R approaching 1 2 log P. This result is stated in the following lemma, as in [36, Proposition 3] .
Lemma 2 ( [43] , [44] ): For any small enough δ > 0, there exists a positive constant γ , which is independent of P, such that if we choose
then the average power constraint is satisfied, i.e., E X 2 ≤ P, and for almost all {c i } L i=1 , except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero, the probability of error is bounded by
where η γ is a positive constant which is independent of P. Furthermore, as a simple extension, if b i are drawn independently from different constellations C i (a, Q i ), the lower bound in (21) can be modified as
IV. CONVERSE FOR IC-EE In this section, we develop a converse for the K -user IC-EE (see Fig. 2 (a)) defined in (1) and (2) with the secrecy constraint (4). We start with the sum rate:
, and all the c i s in Sections IV and V are constants which do not depend on P.
For each j , we introduceX j = X j +Ñ j , whereÑ j is an
are mutually independent, and are independent of all other random variables. Continuing from (33),
whereX K 1 = {X j } K j =1 , and the last inequality is due to the fact that h(Y K 1 , Z|X K 1 ) ≤ nc , i.e., given all the channel inputs (disturbed by small Gaussian noises), the channel outputs can be reconstructed, which is shown as follows
Next, we note, for j = 1, . . . , K ,
where the inequalities are due to the differential entropy version of [47, Problem 2.14] . Inserting (45) into (39), for any j = 1, . . . , K , we get
which means that the net effect of the presence of an eavesdropper is to eliminate one of the channel inputs; we call this the secrecy penalty.
We apply the role of a helper lemma, Lemma 1, to eachX i with k = i + 1 (for i = K , k = 1), in (48) as
for j = 1, . . . , K . Therefore, we have a total of K bounds in (51) for j = 1, . . . , K . Summing these K bounds, we obtain:
completing the converse for IC-EE.
V. CONVERSE FOR IC-CM
In this section, we develop a converse for the K -user IC-CM (see Fig. 2(b) ). We focus on the secrecy constraint (5) at a single receiver, say j , as an eavesdropper, and start with the sum rate corresponding to all unintended messages at receiver j :
is the message set containing all unintended messages with respect to receiver j ,
For each j , we introduceX j = X j +Ñ j , whereÑ j is an i.i.d. sequence ofÑ j which is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance σ 2
are mutually independent, and are independent of all other random variables. Continuing from (64),
where the last inequality is due to the fact that h(Y K 1 |X K 1 ) ≤ nc , i.e., given all the channel inputs (disturbed by small Gaussian noises), the channel outputs can be reconstructed, which is shown as follows
We apply the role of a helper lemma, Lemma 1, to eachX i with k = i + 1 (for i = K , k = 1), in (70) as
By noting that h(Y i ) ≤ n 2 log P + nc i for each i , we have
for j = 1, . . . , K . Therefore, we have a total of K bounds in (81) for j = 1, . . . , K . Summing these K bounds, we obtain:
completing the converse for IC-CM.
VI. ACHIEVABILITY
In this section, we provide achievability for the K -user IC-CM-EE (see Fig. 2(c) ), which will imply achievability for K -user IC-EE and K -user IC-CM. We will prove that, for almost all channel gains, a sum secure d.o.f. lower bound of
is achievable for the K -user IC-CM-EE.
A. Background
In this section, we will summarize the achievability scheme for the two-user IC-CM in [38] , motivate the need for simultaneous alignment of multiple signals at multiple receivers in this K -user case, and provide an example of simultaneously aligning two signals at two receivers via asymptotic real alignment [44] . We provide the general achievable scheme for K > 2 in Section VI-B via cooperative jamming and asymptotic real alignment, and show that it achieves the sum secure d.o.f. in (84) via a detailed performance analysis in Section VI-C.
In the achievable scheme for K = 2 in [38] , four mutually independent discrete random variables {V 1 , U 1 , V 2 , U 2 } are employed (see [38, Fig. 10] ). Each of them is uniformly and independently drawn from the discrete constellation C(a, Q) given in (10) . The role of V i is the signal carrying message W i , and the role of U i is to cooperatively jam receiver i to help transmitter-receiver pair j , where j = i , for i, j = 1, 2. By carefully selecting the transmit coefficients, U 1 and V 2 are aligned at receiver 1, and U 2 and V 1 are aligned at receiver 2; and therefore, U 1 protects V 2 , and U 2 protects V 1 . By this signalling scheme, information leakage rates are upper bounded by constants, and the message rates are made to scale with power P, reaching the secure d.o.f. capacity of the two-user IC-CM which is 2 3 . Here, for the K -user IC-CM-EE, we employ a total of K 2 random variables,
which are illustrated in Fig. 3 for the case of K = 3. The scheme proposed here has two major differences from [38] : 1) Instead of using a single random variable to carry a message, we use a total of K − 1 random variables to carry each message. For transmitter i , K − 1 random variables {V i j } j =i , each representing a sub-message, collectively carry message W i . 2) Rather than protecting one message at one receiver, each U k simultaneously protects a portion of all sub-messages at all required receivers. More specifically, U k protects {V ik } i =k,i = j at receivers j , and at the eavesdropper (if there is any). For example, in Fig. 3 , U 1 protects V 21 and V 31 where necessary. In particular, U 1 protects V 21 at receivers 1, 3 and the eavesdropper; and it protects V 31 at receivers 1, 2 and the eavesdropper. As a technical challenge, this requires U 1 to be aligned with the same signal, say V 21 , at multiple receivers simultaneously, i.e., at receivers 1, 3 and the eavesdropper. These particular alignments are circled by ellipsoids in Fig. 3 . We do these simultaneous alignments using asymptotic real alignment technique proposed in [44] and used in [30] and [36] . 4 For illustration purposes, in the rest of this section, we demonstrate how we can align two signals at two receivers simultaneously; in particular, we will align U 1 with V 21 at Y 1 and Y 3 , simultaneously. Towards this end, we will further divide the random variable V 21 , which represents a submessage, into a large number of random variables denoted as V 21 = {v 21t : t = 1, . . . , |T 1 |}. We then send each one of these random variables after multiplying it with one of the coefficients in the following set which serves as the set of 4 The achievability scheme developed in this paper relies on the perfect knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) of all channels at all terminals. References [39] , [40] developed a blind cooperative jamming scheme that utilizes only the legitimate receiver's CSI. In particular, [40] dimensions: 11 11 h r 21 21 h r 13 13 h r 23 23 : r 11 , r 21 , r 13 , r 23 ∈ {1, . . . , m} (87) where m is a very large constant. To perform the alignment, we let U 1 have the same detailed structure as V 21 , i.e., U 1 is also divided into a large number of random variables as U 1 = {u 1t : t = 1, . . . , |T 1 |}. At receiver 1, the elements of U 1 from transmitter 1 occupy the dimensions h 11 T 1 and the elements of V 21 from transmitter 2 occupy the dimensions h 21 T 1 . Although these two sets are not the same, their intersection contains nearly as many elements as T 1 , i.e.,
when m is large, i.e., almost all elements of U 1 and V 21 are asymptotically aligned at receiver 1. The same argument applies for receiver 3. At receiver 3, the elements of U 1 from transmitter 1 occupy the dimensions h 13 T 1 and the elements of V 21 from transmitter 2 occupy the dimensions h 23 T 1 . Again, although these two sets are not the same, their intersection contains nearly as many elements as T 1 . Therefore, almost all elements of U 1 and V 21 are aligned at receivers 1 and 3, simultaneously. These simultaneous alignments are depicted in Fig. 4 . In the following section, we use this basic idea to align multiple signals at multiple receivers simultaneously. This will require a more intricate design of signals and dimensions.
B. General Achievable Scheme via Asymptotic Alignment
Here, we give the general achievable scheme for the K -user IC-CM-EE. Let m be a large constant. Let us define sets T i , for i = 1, . . . , K , which will represent dimensions as follows: Let M i be the cardinality of T i . Note that all M i are the same, thus we denote them as M,
For each transmitter i , for j = i , let t i j be the vector containing all the elements in the set T j . Therefore, t i j is an M-dimensional vector containing M rationally independent real numbers in T j . The sets t i j will represent the dimensions along which message signals are transmitted. In particular, for any given (i, j ) with i = j , t i j will represent the dimensions in which message signal V i j is transmitted. In addition, for each transmitter i , let t (i) be the vector containing all the elements in the set T i . Therefore, t (i) is an M-dimensional vector containing M rationally independent real numbers in T i . The sets t (i) will represent the dimensions along which cooperative jamming signals are transmitted. In particular, for any given i , t (i) will represent the dimensions in which cooperative jamming signal U i is transmitted. Let us define a K M dimensional vector b i by stacking t i j and t (i) as
Then, transmitter i generates a vector a i , which contains a total of K M discrete signals each identically and independently drawn from C(a, Q). For convenience, we partition this transmitted signal as
where v i j represents the information symbols in V i j , and u i represents the cooperative jamming signal in U i . Each of these vectors has length M, and therefore, the total length of a i is K M. The channel input of transmitter i is
Before we investigate the performance of this signalling scheme in Section VI-C, we analyze the structure of the received signal at the receivers. Without loss of generality we will focus on receiver 1; by symmetry, a similar structure will exist at all other receivers. We observe that in addition to the additive Gaussian noise, receiver 1 receives all the vectors v j k for all j, k ( j = k) and u i for all i . All of these signals get multiplied with the corresponding channel gains before they arrive at receiver 1. Due to the specific signalling structure used at the transmitters, and the multiplications with different channel gains over the wireless communication channel, the signals arrive at the receiver lying in various different dimensions.
To see the detailed structure of the received signals at the receivers, let us defineT i as a superset of T i , as follows
The information symbols coming from transmitter 1 are in vectors v 12 , v 13 , . . . , v 1K which are multiplied by coefficients in t 12 , t 13 , . . . , t 1K before they are sent. These coefficients come from sets T 2 , T 3 , . . . , T K , respectively. After going through the channel, all of these coefficients get multiplied by h 11 . Therefore, the receiving coefficients of v 12 , v 13 , . . . , v 1K are h 11 t 12 , h 11 t 13 , . . . , h 11 t 1K , which are the dimensions in the sets h 11 T 2 , h 11 T 3 , . . . , h 11 T K , respectively. By construction, since each T i has powers of h ii in it (but no h j j ), these dimensions are separate almost surely. These correspond to separate boxes of V 12 and V 13 at receiver 1 in Fig. 3 for the example case of K = 3.
On the other hand, all of the cooperative jamming signals from all of the transmitters u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u K come to receiver 1 with received coefficients h 11 t (1) , h 21 t (2) , . . . , h K 1 t (K ) , which are the dimensions in the sets h 11 T 1 , h 21 T 2 , . . . , h K 1 T K , respectively. We note that almost surely all of these dimensions are separate among themselves, and they are separate from the dimensions of the message signals coming from transmitter 1. That is, all of the dimensions in h 11 T 2 , h 11 T 3 , . . . , h 11 T K and h 11 T 1 , h 21 T 2 , . . . , h K 1 T K are all mutually different, again owing to the fact that each T i contains powers of h ii in it. These correspond to separate boxes of V 12 , V 13 , U 1 , U 2 and U 3 at receiver 1 in Fig. 3 for the example case of K = 3.
Next, we note that each u i is aligned together with all of the v j i coming from the j th transmitter, with j = i and j = 1, at receiver 1. Note that u i occupies dimensions h i1 T i and v j i (for any j = i and j = 1) occupies dimensions h j 1 T i at receiver 1. From the arguments in Section VI-A, u i and v j i (with j = i and j = 1) are asymptotically aligned. More formally, we note that u i occupies dimensions h i1 T i which is contained inT i . Similarly, all v j i , with j = i and j = 1, occupy dimensions h j 1 T i , respectively, which are all contained inT i . Therefore, u i and all v j i (with j = i and j = 1) are all aligned alongT i . These alignments are shown as U 1 being aligned with V 21 and V 31 ; U 2 being aligned with V 32 ; and U 3 being aligned with V 23 at receiver 1 in Fig. 3 for the example case of K = 3. Further, we note that, since only T i andT i contain powers of h ii , the dimensions h 11 T 2 , h 11 T 3 , . . . , h 11 T K ,T 1 ,T 2 , . . . ,T K are all separable. This implies that all the elements in the set
are rationally independent, and thereby the cardinality of S 1 is
(98)
C. Performance Analysis
We will compute the secrecy rates achievable with the asymptotic alignment based scheme proposed in Section VI-B by using the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For K -user interference channels with confidential messages and one external eavesdropper, the following rate region is achievable
where for convenience we denote Z by Y 0 , V K −i = {V j } K j =1, j =i and K 0,−i = {0, 1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , K }. The auxiliary random variables {V i } K i=1 are mutually independent, and for each i , we have the following Markov chain
In developing the achievable rates in Theorem 2, we focus on a single transmitter, say i , and consider the compound setting associated with message W i , where this message needs to be secured against a total of K eavesdroppers, with K − 1 of them being the other legitimate receivers ( j = i ) and the remaining one being the external eavesdropper ( j = 0). A proof of this theorem is given in Appendix.
We apply Theorem 2 to our alignment based scheme proposed in Section VI-B by selecting V i used in (99) as
for i = 1, . . . , K . By Lemma 2, for any δ > 0, there exists a positive constant γ , which is independent of P, such that if we choose Q = P 1−δ 2(M S +δ) and a = γ P 1 2 Q , then for almost all channel gains the average power constraint is satisfied and the probability of error is bounded by
where η γ i is a positive constant which is independent of P andV i is the estimate for V i obtained by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on observation Y i . By Fano's inequality and the Markov chain V i → Y i →V i , we know that,
where o(·) is the little-o function, V i is the alphabet of V i and, in this case, the cardinality of V i is (2Q + 1) (K −1)M = (2Q + 1) (K −1)m K 2 +1 . Here, M is defined in (90). This provides a lower bound for the first term in (99). Next, we need to derive an upper bound for the second item in (99), i.e, the secrecy penalty. For any i ∈ K = {1, . . . , K } and j ∈ K −i = {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , K }, by the Markov
The first term in (111) can be rewritten as
Note that, for a given k, the vectors t ik and t (k) represent the same dimensions T k , and h i j , h kj ∈ T k for all k = i , which implies that h i j T k , h kj T k ∈T k . In addition, for each k, we note that a large part of the two sets h i j T k and h kj T k are the same, i.e.,
Therefore, the first term in (111) can be further upper bounded as
which implies that the first term in (111) can be upper bounded by (119) (on bottom of the page). The second term in (111) is exactly the entropy of {u k } K k=1 vectors, i.e.,
where (121) is true for almost all channel gains. Substituting (119) and (123) into (111), we get
We note that by choosing m large enough, the factor before the 1 2 log P term can be made arbitrarily small. Due to the non-perfect (i.e., only asymptotical) alignment, the upper bound for the information leakage rate is not a constant as in [38] , but a function which can be made to approach zero d.o.f. For any i ∈ K and j = 0, i.e., Y 0 = Z the external eavesdropper, we should derive a new upper bound for the second term in (111), i.e., I (V i ; Z |V K −i ). By similar steps, we have
where (129) is true for almost all channel gains. Here, we need to upper bound the first item in (129). We first observe that
Firstly, note that, t (k) and t ik represent the same set T k . Therefore, for different k, the dimensions are distinguishable. Secondly, due to reasons similar to (114), we conclude that
Substituting (135) into (129), we attain an upper bound which is the same as the upper bound for I (V i ; Y j |V K −i ), i.e.,
Substituting (109), (125), and (136) into (99), we obtain a lower bound for the achievable secrecy rate R i as
By choosing m → ∞ and δ → 0, we can achieve secrecy sum rates arbitrarily close to K −1 2K −1 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied secure communications in K -user Gaussian interference networks from an information-theoretic point of view, and addressed three important channel models: IC-EE, IC-CM and their combination IC-CM-EE in a unified framework. We showed that, for all three models, the sum secure d.o.f. is exactly K (K −1)
2K −1 . Our achievability is based on structured signalling, structured cooperative jamming, channel prefixing and asymptotic real interference alignment. The key insight of the achievability is to carefully design the structure of all of the signals at the transmitters so that the signals are received at both legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers in most desirable manner from a secure communication point of view. In particular, cooperative jamming signals protect information carrying signals via alignment, and the information carrying signals are further aligned to maximize secure d.o.f.
APPENDIX
We first provide an outline of the proof. Our proof will combine and extend techniques from [5] and [26] . Our approach has three main components. First, as in [5] , we condition the mutual information representing the secrecy leakage rate on the signals that carry the messages of other transmitter-receiver pairs. That is, for any given i , we condition the subtracted mutual information term in (99) on V K −i . This creates enhanced eavesdroppers. If we can guarantee secrecy against these enhanced eavesdroppers, we can guarantee secrecy against the original eavesdroppers. More specifically, for the leakage rate of message of transmitter i at receiver j , with j = i , we use
is the output of an enhanced eavesdropper with respect to message W i . Second, as in [26] , we consider the secrecy rate achievable against the strongest enhanced eavesdropper for each message. Therefore, as argued in [26, Appendix A], if we can guarantee a secrecy rate against the strongest eavesdropper, we can guarantee this secrecy rate against the original eavesdroppers. More specifically, let Y (i) be an element of the set {Y 1 , . . . , Y k , Z }\{Y i } such that
That is, Y (i) is the strongest eavesdropper with respect to transmitter i . The achievable rate in (99) considers the strongest eavesdropper for each message. Therefore, for each transmitter i , we construct a compound wiretap code as in [26] . Third, we prove secrecy for each message W i , via the following equivocation inequality
for some arbitrarily small number (i) . Here, as in the main body of the paper, we denote n-length sequences with boldface letters. The secrecy constraints in (140) fit the created equivalent view of the channel better. As we show next, secrecy constraints in (140) imply our original secrecy constraints in (4) and (5) . Towards this end, first note that, for each i ,
is the strongest eavesdropper with respect to transmitter i and by using the enhanced eavesdropper argument in [26, Appendix A] . Then, the fact that (140) for all i implies the original secrecy constraints in (4) and (5) follows from the following derivation:
where (Z ) is small for sufficiently large n. We start by choosing the following rates for the secure and confusion messages of transmitter i:
Transmitter i generates 2 n(R i +R c i ) independent sequences each with probability
and constructs a codebook as
To transmit a message w i , transmitter i chooses an element v i from the sub-codebook C i (w i )
and generates a channel input sequence based on
Due to the code construction, we have R i + R c i < I (V i ; Y i ), for all i . Therefore, for sufficiently large n i , we can find a codebook such that the probability of error at the corresponding receiver i can be upper bounded by an arbitrarily small number, i.e., Pr(e i ) (n i ) ≤ . Then, let n = max i n i , which gives max i Pr(e i ) (n) ≤ .
For the equivocation calculation, we consider the following conditional entropy as discussed before:
where the last equality is due to the Markov chain
. The first term in (164) is exactly the entropy of codebook C i :
To bound the second term in (164), we have the following observation: Given the message W i = w i and the received sequences Y (i) = y (i) and genie-aided sequences
with arbitrarily small probability of error λ(w i ) (n) as n gets very large. More formally: by giving
Otherwise, the receiver declares an error. Without loss of generality, we assume that v i (w i , w c 1 ) is sent and denote the event
Therefore, the probability of error λ(w i ) (n) can be bounded as
where the probability here is conditioned on the event that v i (w i , w c 1 ) is sent. By joint typicality, we know that Pr(E c 1 ) ≤ 1 for sufficiently large n, and
where 1 , 2 , . . . in this section are small positive numbers for sufficiently large n. Hence,
Note that R c i = I (V i ; Y (i) |V K −i ) − . Therefore, we can conclude that λ(w i ) (n) ≤ 3 for sufficiently large n, which
by Fano's inequality further implies that
The third term in (164) can be lower bounded as in (177) (on top of the page).
To compute the forth term in (164), we definê
Then, we obtain
Combining Fano's inequality and the fact that
is arbitrarily small for sufficiently large n, (182) implies
Substituting (165), (170), (178), and (184) into (164), we conclude that
where (i) is small for sufficiently large n, which completes the proof. 
